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## Green Fiscal Reform, Energy Reform & Competitiveness

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Presentation to Green Budget Europe conference 'Recovery, Jobs and Sustainable Prosperity: a New Agenda..' Brussels, 5 November 2014





## Some prefatory remarks

- On Multiple Objectives
- 20 years on from Krugman (Foreign Affairs, 1994):
  - ".. concerns about [national] competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely unfounded ... the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system...."
- Competitiveness is primarily a *sectoral* concern though obviously influenced by wider economic and cross-cutting policy factors
- The 2030 Package, 2025 Bridge, and Energy Union: an unparalleled opportunity?



## On Jobs & Macro-competiveness (1)

- A reasonable hypothesis could be that taxing resources / environmental damage instead of labour or capital could be expected to lead to net increase in jobs
- There are also counter arguments, surrounding the impact of "economic distortions" earlier in the value chain propagating through the system and depressing GDP growth, assuming the current system is approximately optimal (a rather 'herioc assumption'; and ignoring unpriced environmental impacts)
- There are of course counter-counter arguments, and growing numbers of modelling studies (see most recently eg. FTI consulting, and Barker et al., (CUP 2015)
- Actually, these issues may be eclipsed by bigger factors affecting Europe's long run employment & growth prospects ....



## On Jobs & Macro-competiveness (2)

- Long run economic prospects more likely to hinge on, *i.a.*:
  - Wider structural factors (eg. Labour market rules, etc)
  - Containing the debt problem
  - Resources efficiency
  - Attracting investment
  - Innovation & infrastructure
- To an important degree, influenced by
  - stability in factor prices and political risk
  - revenues, expenditure, and leverage effects
  - Sectoral strategies and *integrated policy packages*



# Carbon revenues may be substantial (but are not free)



- Financial crisis persists and expected ETS revenues were €20-30bn/yr
- EU needs investment including heavy investment in energy sector (many hundreds of €bns total over this decade)
- Crucial issue is the distributive effects between consumers & sectors, and ways of utilitising revenues between general, energy & international

	In 2013 (@ €15/tCO₂)	In 2020 (@ €22/tCO₂)
EU-27	€ 19 billion	€ 27 billion
Germany	€ 5.1 billion	€ 6.8 billion
υк	€ 2.6 billion	€ 3.4 billion
Poland	€ 1.6 billion	€ 3.3 billion
Spain	€ 1.6 billion	€ 2.2 billion
Italy	€ 1.7 billion	€ 2.4 billion
Greece	€ 0.8 billion	€1 billion
Netherlands	€ 0.7 million	€ 0.9 billion
Romania	€ 150 million	€ 650 million

Source: Grubb et al. (2014), Strengthening the EU ETS, Climate Strategies www.climatestrategies.org

#### Understanding sectoral structure *is fundamental* "Who's hit?" In industry – c. half a dozen primary commodity sector



41% of EU 'value added' (GDP) in manufacturing industry + utilities

Source: Planetary Economics Ch.8 Figure 8-4 Impact of carbon pricing on EU industry sectors and their share of the EU economy



PLANETARY ECONOMICS

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# A brief look at Steel





EBITDA margin (%)

Data: Orbis

Source: Neuhoff K. et al.(2014), *Climate Strategies* Steel Report



1



Carbon: No magic bullet, but diversity of options in manufacturing, recycling and use

2

eales

Illustration





#### R&D intensity maintained

- but low in comparison with many other sectors





Source: Neuhoff K. et al.(2014), *Climate Strategies* Steel Report





2



Expectation of climate policy initiated ULCOS project

#### Why have ULCOS projects stalled?

- CCS-based technologies only viable with permanent carbon pricing regime
- Steel firms not prepared to finance and take whole risk (EC was not prepared to take risk share under NER 300 facility)
- (Political challenges of CCS in Europe)





More generally, we are seeking radical innovation in sectors that spend exceptionally low share of revenue on R&D



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**Planetary Economics,** Chapter 9 'Pushing further, pulling deeper' Fig.9.3 R&D expenditure by top companies in different sectors as % of sales, 2011

Data source: EU Joint Research Centre on Industrial Investment and Innovation, R&D Scoreboard 2012,

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# Back to some Theory



#### Effective policy needs to harness three pillars ....





## Having established competitive European markets, the structural gap is mostly in the mid-stages of the innovation process



Fig.9.8 (b) The funding gap under R&D + undifferentiated demand-pull subsidies

Graph adapted from : Carbon Trust (Haj Hassan et al, 2008)

.. Designing positive interactions between the Pillars means being willing to look at earmarking at least some revenues



•Climate policy can neither resolve nor ignore surplus capacity & low profitability

•Low-carbon roadmap could become a starting point for industry vision

• Develop joint strategy to unlock portfolio of mitigation options

•Translate roadmap into tangible investment and innovation framework

•Long-term credible leakage protection – border levelling or consumptionbased approaches

- •carbon price & carbon price pass through
- •Flexibilty under ETS cap avoids controversy about sector target
- •Explore complementary regulatory / engagement policies
- •Provide public funding and support for innovation

•Innovation & engaging customers strengthens position of EU steel





# Returning fully to the macroeconomic level ...

- The 'residual' accounting for typically half of observed economic growth that cannot be explained by resource and capital accumulation
  - (Planetary Economics Ch.11 the "Dark Matter" of growth)
- Economic research points two broad areas for attention:
  - Persistent suboptimal performance of many economic actors and structures
  - Inadequate education, infrastructure and suboptimal rates of innovation
- ie. First and Third domain processes recognised as important for macroeconomic growth. Yet these remain
  - largely absent in global (or national) modelling
  - poorly charted in policy
- Energy & heavy manufacturing particularly strong candidates because
  - Pervasive 'incidental' consumer cost & input to production sectors
  - Fossil fuel markets (hence cost base) intrinsically unstable
  - Exceptionally low rates of innovation particularly elec. & construction





# Some suggestive alignment of Three Pillars with structure of the WEF Global Competitiveness Index ...



## Planetary Economics:

#### Energy, Climate Change and the Three Domains of Sustainable Development



Book lecture: London School of Economics, 6 November 2014, 6.00pm

www.climatestrategies.org/events/2014-events/book.html for information and register of related events.

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